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Cost-effective	decarbonisation	in	the	EU	–	An	overview	of	policy	suitability	
	
	
1. Introduction	
	
The	 EU	 has	 a	 stated	 commitment	 to	 reduce	 its	 GHG	 (and	 consequently,	 CO2)	
emissions	 by	 80-95%	 from	 1990	 levels	 by	 2050.	 Various	 modelling	 studies	 have	
sought	to	determine	cost-effective	pathways	for	achieving	this	aim.	This	paper	first	
identifies	 the	 contemporary	 CO2	 emission	 and	 energy	 consumption	 profiles,	 and	
recent	 trends,	 for	 key	 sectors	 of	 the	 energy	 system	 (power	 generation,	 heavy	
industry,	residential	buildings	and	road	(passenger	car)	transport1),	and	the	profiles	
they	 must	 exhibit	 by	 2030	 and	 2050	 to	 achieve	 a	 cost-effective	 low-carbon	
transition,	based	on	a	comparison	of	results	of	four	key	modelling	studies.	For	each	
sector	key	elements	of	the	policy	landscape	at	EU	level	are	presented,	along	with	a	
discussion	of	 their	 likely	contribution	to	the	contemporary	profile.	For	each	sector,	
this	concludes	with	an	overview	discussion	of	the	apparent	suitability	of	the	current	
policy	landscape	for	driving	the	changes	needed	to	achieve	required	profile	outlined	
for	 2030	 and	 2050.	 This	 paper	 therefore	 provides,	 first,	 a	 comparison	 of	 recent	
sector-level	CO2	emission	and	energy	consumption	trends	with	what	 is	 required	 in	
the	future	in	order	to	achieve	a	cost-effective	decarbonisation	of	key	sectors	of	the	
EU	energy	system,	and	second,	a	recent,	cross-sectoral	overview	of	the	suitability	of	
the	 existing	 suite	 of	 key	 EU	 policy	 instruments	 (including	 recently	 announced	
changes)	for	achieving	these	requirements.	
	
Section	 2	 first	 presents	 the	 four	 modelling	 scenarios	 from	 which	 2030	 and	 2050	
requirements	 are	 distilled.	 Section	 3	 then	 describes	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 the	
analysis.	Sections	4-7	 follows	 this	 to	present	 the	analysis	 for	each	sector	 identified	
above,	in	turn.	Section	8	concludes.	
	
2. Decarbonisation	studies	and	scenarios																																																									
1	The	agriculture,	upstream	and	waste	sectors	are	excluded,	due	to	their	relatively	minor	contribution	
to	CO2	emissions	in	the	EU	(~2%).	
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This	 section	 presents	 four	 studies	 that	 seek	 to	 project	 cost-effective	 pathways	 for	
the	decarbonisation	of	the	EU’s	energy	system	by	2050.	It	is	from	these	studies	the	
key	elements	of	the	sector	profiles	required	by	2030	and	2050	are	derived.	
	
The	 first	 two	studies	were	completed	as	part	of	 the	CECILIA2050	project,	 to	which	
this	Special	 Issue	 is	dedicated.	The	first	employs	the	European	TIMES	Model	 (ETM-
UCL),	 a	 dynamic	 partial-equilibrium	 energy	 system	 model	 with	 an	 inter-temporal	
objective	 function	 to	 minimise	 total	 discounted	 system	 costs.	 The	 second	 study	
employs	the	economic-environmental	model	GINFORS,	an	environmentally	extended	
global	mutli-regional	 input-output	model.	The	decarbonisation	scenarios	applied	to	
these	 models,	 which	 were	 aligned	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 complementary	 insights	
(including	GDP,	population	and	household	number	projections),	sought	to	achieve	an	
80%	reduction	in	CO2	emissions	in	the	EU	by	2050	from	1990	levels.	The	EU’s	’20-20-
20’	targets	for	CO2	emissions,	renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	are	achieved	
in	these	studies	by	design.		Further	detail	on	these	models,	scenario	design	and	their	
results,	may	be	 found	 in	Solano	et	al	 (this	 issue)	and	Meyer	et	al	 (2014).	The	third	
study	 examined	 is	 the	 Energy	 Roadmap	 2050	 (ER2050),	 produced	 in	 2012	 at	 the	
request	of	the	European	Council	to	 ‘explore	the	challenges	posed	by	delivering	the	
EU’s	decarbonisation	objective	[of	an	80%	reduction	in	CO2	emissions	by	2050]	while	
at	the	same	time	ensuring	security	of	energy	supply	and	competitiveness’	(European	
Commission,	 2012,	 p.3).	 In	 this	 paper	 we	 examine	 the	 results	 of	 the	 ‘Diversified	
Supply	 Technologies’	 scenario,	 under	 which	 a	 cost-minimising,	 technology-neutral	
approach	determines	the	evolution	of	a	decarbonised	energy	system.	The	20-20-20	
targets	 are	 also	 achieved	 in	 this	 study,	 by	 design.	 Results	 for	 the	 ER2050	 were	
produced	 by	 the	 partial-equilibrium	 energy	 system	 model	 PRIMES.	 	 More	
information	 on	 the	 model,	 scenarios	 and	 results	 of	 this	 study	 may	 be	 found	 in	
European	 Commission	 (2011b).	 The	 fourth	 and	 final	 study	 considered	 is	 the	 2012	
edition	of	the	International	Energy	Agency’s	(IEA)	‘Energy	Technology	Perspectives’.	
In	this	paper	we	consider	results	for	the	EU	in	the	‘2	Degrees’	scenario	(2DS),	under	
which	 the	global	energy	system	reduces	CO2	emissions	by	2050	consistent	with	an	
80%	chance	of	limiting	average	global	temperature	increase	to	2°C	(approximately	a	
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50%	reduction	in	global	CO2	emissions	from	2009	levels).	This	analysis	also	employs	a	
TIMES	modelling	platform	–	the	ETP-TIMES.	For	more	information,	see	IEA	(2012).	
	
Each	of	 these	 studies	 seek	 to	project	 cost-effective	decarbonisation	pathways,	but	
not	necessarily	 least-cost.	Each	imposes	a	range	of	constraints	to	take	into	account	
issues	 such	 as	 lead	 times,	 political	 preferences	 and	 public	 acceptance,	which	may	
produce	additional	cost	against	what	the	models	employed	may	otherwise	produce	
in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 level	 of	 decarbonisation	 required.	 However,	 this	 improves	
the	practical	feasibility	of	the	pathways	produced.	
	
3. Approach	to	sectoral	analysis	
	
Sections	4-7	first	outline	contemporary	sector	profiles,	and	then	examine	how	such	
profiles	 should	 evolve	 to	 2030	 and	 2050	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 a	 cost-effective	 low-
carbon	transition,	based	on	a	comparison	of	results	of	the	four	key	modelling	studies	
identified	in	Section	2.		Such	characteristics	are	commonly	presented	as	minimum	or	
maximum	 threshold	 values	 (as	 appropriate),	 to	 reflect	 the	 requirement	 that	 CO2	
emissions	 are	 to	 be	 reduced	 by	 at	 least	 80%	 by	 2050	 from	 1990	 levels,	 and	 that	
underachievement	 in	 one	 sector	would	 require	 others	 to	 compensate.	 Projections	
for	CO2	emissions	and	energy	consumption	are	provided	against	1990	and	2014	(the	
most	recent	year	for	which	comprehensive	data	is	available),	and	are	rounded	to	the	
nearest	 5%.	 Energy	 distribution	 and	 related	 infrastructure,	 such	 as	 electricity	
transmission	and	distribution,	smart	meters	and	electric	vehicle	charging	points,	are	
not	 considered.	 Although	 alluded	 to	 (e.g.	 ‘acceleration	 of	 efforts	 to	 develop	 the	
transmission	 system	 is	 needed’	 (IEA,	 2012,	 p.568)),	 such	 infrastructure	 are	 not	
considered	or	presented	in	detail	in	the	four	studies	examined.		
	
For	each	sector,	key	elements	of	the	policy	landscape	at	EU	level	are	then	presented,	
along	 with	 a	 discussion	 of	 their	 likely	 contribution	 to	 cotemporary	 profiles.	 This	
concludes	 with	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 apparent	 suitability	 of	 the	 current	 policy	
landscape	 for	 driving	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 sector	 towards	 the	 profile	 outlined	 for	
2030	 and	 2050.	 The	 analysis	 is	 necessarily	 not	 exhaustive	 in	 each	 sector,	 but	
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addresses	 the	 principal	 instruments	 and	 elements	 at	 the	 EU	 level.	 Measures	
introduced	 purely	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 not	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 specific	 EU-level	
requirements,	are	excluded	 from	the	analysis,	as	are	 those	that	seek	to	encourage	
innovation	as	their	primary	motive.		
	
4. Power	sector	
	
4.1	Contemporary	sector	profile	
	
Power	generation	accounted	for	the	largest	proportion	of	CO2	emissions	in	the	EU28	
in	2014,	at	31%.2	In	 the	same	year,	 conventional	 thermal	 (coal	and	gas)	accounted	
for	 48%	 of	 total	 generation,	 nuclear	 for	 27%,	 hydropower	 for	 13%,	 and	 other	
renewables	(principally	wind)	accounting	for	the	remaining	12%.	Between	2004	and	
2014,	 CO2	 emissions	 decreased	 at	 an	 average	 annual	 rate	 of	 2.5%,	 with	 total	
electricity	generation	remaining	 largely	stable.	As	such,	CO2	 intensity	of	generation	
reduced	by	an	annual	average	of	10	gCO2/kWh	(to	351	gCO2/kWh	in	2014).3	
	
4.2	Required	sector	profile	–	2030	and	2050	
	
Each	study	examined	projects	a	reduction	in	CO2	emissions	from	the	power	sector	of	
at	least	60%	by	2030	and	90%	by	2050	below	1990	(20%	and	90%	below	2014)	levels,	
respectively,	 despite	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 power	 generation	 (at	 an	 average	 of	
around	35%	by	2050,	from	present	levels)	in	order	to	satisfy	increasing	electrification	
of	end-use	sectors	(discussed	in	subsequent	sections).	As	such,	the	CO2	intensity	of	
power	generation	should	reduce	to	a	maximum	of	around	150	gCO2/kWh	by	2030,	
and	10	gCO2/kWh	by	2050.	
	
Although	 projections	 of	 the	 specific	 composition	 of	 the	 generation	 profile	 vary	
relatively	 substantially	 between	 the	 four	 studies	 (e.g.	 projected	 deployment	 of																																																									
2	Data	from	European	Environment	Agency’s	GHG	Data	Viewer.	Excluding	land	use,	land	use	change	
and	forestry.	
3	EUROSTAT	Statistics.	
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renewable	 generation	 varies	 from	 around	 55%	 (IEA)	 to	 90%	 (GINFORS)	 by	 2050),	
there	 are	 two	 points	 of	 clear	 consensus.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 unabated	 fossil	 fuel	
generation	 must	 reduce	 substantially,	 to	 a	 maximum	 of	 around	 40%	 of	 total	
generation	by	2030,	and	10%	by	2050	(with	what	remains	sourced	from	natural	gas,	
with	generation	from	unabated	coal	entirely	removed	by	2050).	The	second	 is	that	
generation	 from	 renewables4	should	 increase	 rapidly	 to	 2030,	 and	 be	 the	 largest	
single	power	source	by	2050	(accounting	for	at	least	40%	and	60%	of	generation	by	
2030	 and	 2050).	 Nuclear	 generation	 maintains	 or	 decreases	 in	 proportional	
contribution	 in	 all	 cases	 from	 current	 levels.	 Fossil	 fuel	 with	 carbon	 capture	 and	
storage	 (CCS)	 is	 introduced	 in	 two	of	 the	 four	 scenarios	examined	by	2030,	and	 in	
three	by	20505	-	achieving	around	25%	of	generation	in	the	ETM-UCL	study.		
	
4.3	Policy	landscape	–	key	elements	
	
The	 EU	 Emission	 Trading	 System	 (EU	 ETS),	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 EU	 climate	 policy	
landscape,	 has	 capped	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 the	 power	 and	 heavy	 industry	 sectors	
since	 2005.6	However,	 empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	whilst	 the	 EU	 ETS	 induced	
short-term	 ‘fuel	 switching’	 from	 coal	 to	 gas	 generation	 (particularly	 in	 the	UK	 and	
Germany,	 in	 2005	 and	 2006)	 utilising	 existing	 capacity,	 it	 contributed	 little	 to	 the	
development	of	new	generation	capacity	and	CO2	abatement	in	this	sector.	Instead,	
CO2	abatement	was	 likely	driven	by	 the	2008	 financial	crisis,	which	Bel	and	 Joseph	
(2015)	 calculate	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 vast	majority	of	 abatement	exhibited	by	 EU	
ETS	sectors	since	 its	 inception	(with	the	 instrument	 itself	responsible	for	 just	12%),	
resulting	 in	a	persistently	 low	 (but	 relatively	 volatile)	 carbon	price.	 The	practice	of	
free	permit	allocation	between	2005	and	2011	was	also	a	contributor	(Agnolucci	&	
Drummond,	2014).	Although	full	permit	auctioning	was	applied	to	the	power	sector	
from	 20137,	 the	 prevailing	 carbon	 price	 has	 remained	well	 below	 €10	 /tCO2	 since	
2011;	a	result	of	the	build	up	of	surplus	permits	in	the	system	(around	2.1	billion)	in																																																									
4	Including	hydroelectricity	and	Biomass	with	CCS	(present	in	the	ETM-UCL	results).	
5	Not	included	in	the	GINFORS	study	(in	power	or	industry)	as	an	exogenous	constraint.	
6	Along	with	commercial	(domestic)	aviation,	N2O	from	the	production	of	nitric,	adipic,	glyoxal	and	
glyoxic	acids,	and	PFCs	from	aluminum	production.	Non-Member	States	Iceland,	Lichtenstein	and	
Norway	are	also	covered.	
7	Except	some	derogations	in	certain	Member	States.	
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the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis	(European	Commission,	2016).	To	address	the	surplus,	
a	Market	Stability	Reserve	(MSR)	will	enter	into	force	in	January	2019.	The	MSR	will	
function	by	triggering	adjustments	to	annual	auction	volumes.	When	833	million	or	
more	permits	are	in	circulation,	a	volume	of	permits	equal	to	12%	of	the	circulation	
volume	may	be	deduced	from	auction	volumes	and	placed	in	the	MSR.	Similarly,	100	
million	permits	will	 be	 released	 (if	 available)	 and	made	available	 for	 auction	when	
permit	circulation	is	fewer	than	400	million.	In	parallel,	the	Linear	Reduction	Factor	
(LRF),	the	annual	rate	at	which	the	EU	ETS	cap	reduces,	will	increase	from	1.74%	to	
2.2%	from	2021.8	This	means	the	cap	will	reduce	to	43%	below	2005	levels	by	2030,	
and	achieve	the	EU	ETS’	contribution	to	the	EU-wide	target	of	40%	reduction	in	GHG	
emissions	by	2030.	
	
The	 second	key	 instrument	 is	 the	Renewable	Energy	Directive	 (RED)	 (2009/28/EC),	
which	 places	 legally	 binding	 targets	 on	 Member	 States	 for	 gross	 final	 energy	
consumption	sourced	 from	renewables	by	2020	 (operationalising	 the	20%	EU-wide	
target	for	2020).	Whilst	there	is	no	explicit	sub-target	for	renewable	electricity,	the	
rapid	increase	in	its	deployment	in	recent	years		(from	14%	of	generation	in	2004	to	
over	25%	in	2014),	accounts	for	a	significant	proportion	of	overall	renewable	energy	
deployment	 (European	 Commission,	 2015).	 This	 deployment	 was	 driven	 by	
dedicated	support	mechanisms	 in	Member	States,	 the	most	common	of	which	are	
feed-in	 tariffs	 (FiTs).	 Although	 specific	 designs	 vary	 substantially,	 producing	 varied	
levels	 of	 deployment	 success,	 FiTs	 are	 commonly	 cited	 by	 the	 literature	 as	 being	
highly	 effective	 in	 encouraging	 deployment,	 as	 they	 provide	 long-term	 financial	
certainty	upon	which	 investment	decisions	may	be	taken	(Agnolucci	&	Drummond,	
2014;	Butler	&	Neuhoff,	2009).	However,	Guidelines	for	State	Aid	for	Environmental	
Protection	 and	 Energy	 (2014-2020)	 require	 that	 support	 for	 all	 ‘large’	 installations	
(with	 an	 installed	 capacity	 of	 1MW	 and	 over,	 or	 6MW	 for	 wind)	 are	 subject	 to	 a	
competitive	bidding	process	from	January	2017,	to	ensure	on-going	support	 is	cost	
effective.	 Smaller	 installations	 are	 exempt	 from	 this	 requirement	 (European	
Commission,	2014a).	
																																																								
8	Against	the	average	total	quantity	of	allowances	issued	annually	in	Phase	2	(2008-2012).	
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4.4	Policy	suitability	
	
To	 reach	 2030	 requirements,	 CO2	 emissions	must	 reduce	 by	 an	 annual	 average	 of	
around	1.4%	from	2014	levels.	Although	this	is	below	the	rate	experienced	between	
2004	 and	 2014,	 the	 reduction	 in	 the	 rate	 of	 CO2	 intensity	 of	 generation	 must	
accelerate	 from	 an	 annual	 average	 of	 10	 gCO2/kWh	 to	 around	 12.5	 gCO2/kWh.	
Between	2030	and	2050,	CO2	emissions	must	 reduce	at	an	average	annual	 rate	of	
8.5%,	with	CO2	intensity	reducing	by	an	average	of	7	gCO2/kWh	annually.	
	
The	 LRF	 adjustment	 from	 2021	 under	 the	 EU	 ETS	 initially	 appears	 capable	 of	
satisfying	the	2030	emission	requirement	for	the	power	and	industry	sectors,	with	a	
cap	 set	 at	 20%	 below	 the	 combined	 minimum	 CO2	 abatement	 requirements	 for	
these	 sectors	 as	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	 (see	 Section	 5	 for	 industry	 sector	
requirements).	 Whilst	 the	 literature	 broadly	 concludes	 that	 the	 MSR	 will	 have	 a	
positive	 impact	 on	 the	 surplus	 and	 permit	 prices	 (e.g.	 Neuhoff	 et	 al,	 2015),	 the	
European	 Commission	 (2014b)	 projects	 that	 under	 such	 thresholds	 the	 surplus	
would	 only	 reduce	 below	 800	million	 in	 the	 late	 2020s9,	meaning	 that	 in	 practice	
emissions	 from	 these	 sectors	may	be	higher	 than	 the	nominal	 cap	 for	 these	 years	
(with	permits	 ‘banked’	 from	previous	 years	 used	 for	 compliance).	 Indeed,	 the	 EEA	
(2015a)	project	emissions	under	the	EU	ETS	reducing	to	just	31%	below	2005	levels,	
rather	 than	 43%.	 However,	 this	 remains	 approximately	 in	 line	 with	 the	 minimum	
requirements	for	these	sectors	presented	in	this	paper.	
	
Regardless	 of	 the	 extent	 to	which	 abatement	 is	 achieved	 in	 practice	 by	 2030,	 the	
division	 of	 effort	 between	 the	 power	 and	 industry	 sectors,	 and	 whether	 such	
abatement	would	be	achieved	through	short-term	measures	(such	as	fuel	switching),	
or	through	structural	changes	(such	as	the	development	of	renewables),	is	not	clear	
ex-ante.	Point	Carbon	(2015)	project	 that	such	structural	 reform	of	 the	EU	ETS	will																																																									
9	This	assessment	was	based	on	Option	2d	in	European	Commission	(2014b),	which	although	slightly	
different	in	form	to	the	MSR	design	adopted	(e.g.	the	upper	threshold	modeled	was	1	billion	permits,	
rather	than	833	million),	the	same	conclusion	may	be	reasonably	applied.	
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produce	a	carbon	price	of	around	€30	by	2030.	Figure	1	illustrates	recent	projections	
of	the	levelised	cost	of	generation	(LCOE)	for	various	key	generation	technologies	in	
the	 UK,	 with	 a	 project	 initiation	 date	 of	 2019	 (2018	 for	 coal)10,	 with	 a	 €30	 /tCO2	
carbon	price	added.	
Figure	1	–	Levelised	Cost	of	Electricity	(Source:	DECC	2013;	DECC	2012)	
	
	
Based	on	 the	projections	presented	 in	Figure	1,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	a	€30	 /tCO2	carbon	
price	 in	 2030	 alone,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 would	 be	 insufficient	 to	 incentivise	 the	
development	of	renewables,	nuclear	or	CCS	installations	over	unabated	coal	and	gas	
installations.	 Any	 abatement	 induced	 by	 the	 EU	 ETS	 in	 the	 power	 sector	 by	 2030,	
therefore,	 is	 likely	to	continue	to	be	a	result	of	 fuel	switching	from	existing	coal	to	
gas	 capacity,	 or	 through	 investment	 in	new	gas	 rather	 than	 (unabated)	 coal	 plant.	
However,	 elements	of	 LCOE	 for	 different	options	may	 vary	 substantially	 over	 time	
and	geographies	(e.g.	coal	and	gas	prices,	capital	costs	of	renewable	technologies),	
injecting	uncertainty	to	this	conclusion	for	the	medium	to	long-term.11	This	includes	
possible	 CO2	 constraints	 and	 resulting	 prices	 beyond	 the	 2030	 horizon	 –	 an	
important	 consideration	 for	 such	 long-lived	 infrastructure.	 At	 present	 the	 LRF	 of	
2.5%	is	set	to	continue	to	2050,	producing	a	2050	cap	90%	below	2005	levels,	or	92%	
below	 1990	 levels	 (exceeding	 the	 cumulative	minimum	 requirements	 for	 2050	 for	
both	the	power	and	industry	sectors	as	presented	in	this	paper).																																																									
10	GBP	is	converted	to	EUR	at	a	rate	of	1.3.	All	values	have	a	10%	discount	rate	applied	by	the	source.	11	For	CCS	options	technological	availability	is	a	further	issue,	although	policy	instruments	to	address	this	concern	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	
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Member	 States,	 on	 average,	 are	 on	 track	with	 their	 indicative	 trajectories	 for	 the	
deployment	of	 renewable	electricity	and	other	 renewable	energy	 in	order	 to	meet	
the	2020	RED	target.	 If	 the	growth	rate	of	 renewable	electricity	as	a	proportion	of	
total	generation	were	to	continue	at	the	average	annual	rate	experienced	between	
2004	 and	 2014,	 its	 value	 would	 reach	 over	 48%	 by	 2030	 and	 75%	 by	 2050	 –	
exceeding	 the	 requirements	 presented	 in	 this	 paper.	 However,	 the	 European	
Commission	(2015)	projects	a	reduction	in	the	rate	of	growth,	producing	a	shortfall	
of	 renewable	 electricity	 of	 8.5-13%	 by	 2020,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 8.5-12%	 shortfall	 for	
renewable	 energy	 more	 broadly	 (reaching	 17.5-18.3%	 of	 gross	 final	 energy	
consumption).	A	principal	reason	for	this	is	the	presence	of	non-economic	barriers	to	
the	deployment	of	renewables.	Zane	et	al	(2012)	identify	the	presence	of	complex	or	
inefficient	administrative	procedures	and	long	lead	times	and	delays	as	key	barriers	
to	the	wider	deployment	of	renewable	electricity.12	The	RED	requires	Member	States	
to	 introduce	 ‘enabling	 initiatives’	 to	 remove	 such	 barriers,	 including	 simplification	
and	 increased	 transparency	 for	 spatial	 planning	 and	 other	 administrative	 and	
authorisation	 procedures,	 however	 in	 2013	 the	 European	 Commission	 (2013)	
reported	 limited	 and	 slow	 progress	 in	 implementing	 these	 obligations,	 with	many	
Member	 States	 failing	 to	 address	 this	 aspect	 entirely.	 Although	 the	 European	
Commission	 (2015)	 reports	 that	 some	 recent	 progress	 has	 been	 achieved	 in	 this	
area,	it	recognises	that	further	improvements	are	required.		
	
Another	potential	barrier	to	deployment	is	the	shift	to	competitive	bidding	processes	
for	support	mechanisms.	Whereas	FiTs	provide	certainty	to	investors	on	their	return,	
competitive	support	allocation	approaches	(such	as	auctions)	may	be	less	effective,	
as	 they	 entail	 a	 higher	 investment	 risk	 (although	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 is	 true	
depends	 on	 the	 specific	 instrument	 chosen,	 and	 its	 particular	 design)	 (Butler	 and	
Neuhoff,	2008;	Alishahi	et	al,	2012).	In	addition,	competitive	processes	are	likely	to	
favour	 the	 deployment	 of	 large,	 centralised	 installations	 by	 commercial	
organisations	 (e.g.	 utilities),	which	due	 to	 the	 increased	 complexity,	 administrative	
																																																								
12	Along	with	issues	such	as	grid	capacity,	and	cost	of	connection.	
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burden,	and	 level	of	and	uncertainty	on	return	are	more	 likely	to	engage	 in	such	a	
process	 than	 smaller,	 community-level	 organisations.	 A	 more	 crucial	 issue	 may	
present	 itself	 in	 the	 medium	 term.	 Kampman	 et	 al	 (2015)	 find	 that	 although	
renewable	 energy	 would	 likely	 have	 increased	 in	 some	 Member	 States	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 EU	 requirements,	 mandatory	 targets	 have	 been	 crucial	 in	 driving	
deployment	in	others.	In	contrast	to	the	’20-20-20’	targets	for	2020	instituted	by	the	
2020	Climate	and	Energy	Package,	the	2030	Climate	and	Energy	Framework	imposes	
a	target	for	renewable	energy	at	the	EU,	rather	than	Member	State,	level.13	As	such,	
it	is	possible	that	support	mechanisms	for	renewable	energy	of	all	descriptions	may	
weaken	 (or	 potentially,	 cease)	 in	 some	 Member	 States	 after	 2020	 (or	 once	 their	
mandatory	targets	have	been	achieved).	
	
However,	 a	more	 fundamental	 issue	 is	 the	 design	 and	 operation	 of	 the	 electricity	
market.	 With	 generators	 entering	 the	 market	 according	 to	 their	 merit	 order,	
increasing	 penetration	 of	 (near)	 zero	 marginal	 cost	 renewable	 generators	
increasingly	displaces	fossil	fuel	and	nuclear	capacity,	reducing	wholesale	electricity	
prices	and	revenue	 for	all	market	participants,	creating	a	 ‘missing	money’	problem	
(Joskow,	 2013)	 and	 rendering	 all	 generators	 (fossil	 fuel,	 nuclear	 and	 renewables)	
uneconomic	without	parallel	 (and	 increasingly	expensive)	support	 instruments	(e.g.	
renewable	energy	support	and	capacity	mechanisms),	preventing	investment	in	new	
capacity	of	all	kinds.	If	the	current	design	persists,	therefore,	support	for	instruments	
that	 encourage	 the	 deployment	 of	 renewable	 electricity	 or	 that	 make	 unabated	
fossil	 fuel	 generation	more	 expensive,	 would	 likely	 decrease	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	
energy	 security,	 reliability	 and	 affordability.	 The	 European	 Commission	 recognises	
this,	 and	 recently	 consulted	 on	 potential	 new	market	 designs.	 However,	 the	 final	
proposed	design,	and	date	and	mode	of	introduction,	is	not	yet	clear.	
	
5. Industry	sector	
	
5.1	Contemporary	sector	profile	
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CO2	 emissions	 from	 the	 industrial	 sector	 (both	 energy-related	 and	 from	 industrial	
processes)	accounted	for	21%	of	total	CO2	emissions	 in	the	EU28	in	2014,	with	the	
manufacture	 of	 chemicals	 and	 iron	 and	 steel	 responsible	 for	 around	 half	 of	 this.	
Between	2004	and	2014,	CO2	emissions	and	total	energy	consumption	by	the	sector	
reduced	 by	 an	 annual	 average	 of	 2.5%	 and	 1.8%,	 respectively,	 with	 the	 energy	
carrier	mix	 remaining	 largely	 static	 (electricity	 and	 gas	 around	30%	each,	with	 the	
remainder	 divided	 between	 coal,	 petroleum	 products,	 derived	 heat	 and	
renewables).2,Error!	Bookmark	not	defined.	
	
5.2	Required	sector	profile	–	2030	and	2050	
	
Three	 of	 the	 four	 studies	 examined	 project	 relatively	 consistent	 reductions	 in	 CO2	
emissions	from	the	 industrial	sector,	at	around	50%	below	1990	(20%	below	2014)	
levels	 by	 2030,	 and	 70%	 below	 1990	 (50%	 below	 2014)	 levels	 by	 2050.	 Such	
reductions	 occur	 despite	 increasing	 industrial	 output.14	This	 is	 achieved	 principally	
through	 a	 combination	 of	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 the	 use	 of	 CCS	 on	 industrial	
processes.	 The	 GINFORS	 study	 projects	 a	 reduction	 of	 just	 26%	 below	 1990	 (20%	
above	 2014)	 levels	 by	 2050,	 however	 this	 is	 due	 in	 large	 part	 to	 emissions	
accountancy15	(and	the	absence	of	CCS	technologies,	discussed	below)	in	the	model.	
	
Both	the	ETM-UCL	and	ER2050	studies	project	 final	energy	consumption	to	remain	
largely	 stable	 to	 2030,	 but	 to	 reduce	 by	 5%	 and	 10%,	 respectively,	 below	 present	
levels	 by	 2050.	 The	 IEA,	 however,	 projects	 a	 20%	 increase	 by	 2050. 16 	Energy	
consumption	should	therefore,	at	a	minimum,	not	increase	from	current	levels.	Each	
of	 these	 projections	 is	 significantly	 below	 the	 energy	 consumption	 projections	 in	
their	‘reference’	scenario	counterparts	for	2050	(between	15%	and	30%),	indicating	
a	 relatively	 significant	 increase	 in	 energy	 efficiency	 (and	 reduction	 in	 energy																																																									
14	Growth	in	demand	for	industrial	products	is	driven	primarily	in	all	studies	discussed	by	GDP	growth,	
but	with	different	results	on	the	structure,	scope	and	assumptions	applied	to	each	model.	
15	‘Industrial’	 emissions	 in	 GINFORS	 also	 considers	 emissions	 from	 industry-related	 buildings	 and	
transport,	rather	than	direct	energy	consumption	and	emissions	associated	with	industrial	processes	
alone.	
16	2030	data	are	not	readily	available	for	this	study.	
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intensity)	over	time.	The	composition	of	the	energy	consumption	profile	in	the	two	
studies	for	which	such	data	is	available	(ETM-UCL	and	IEA)	remains	largely	static	over	
the	 assessment	 horizon,	 and	 thus	 little	 CO2	 abatement	 is	 delivered	 through	 fuel	
switching.	The	major	driver	for	abatement	in	the	industrial	sector	is	the	application	
of	CCS	on	industrial	processes	–	responsible	for	over	half	of	the	projected	abatement	
in	 the	 sector	 between	 the	 present	 day	 and	 2050	 in	 the	 ETM-UCL	 results	 (and	
approximately	15%	by	2030),	and	nearly	two-thirds	in	the	IEA	projections.16	
	
5.3	Policy	landscape	–	key	elements	
	
As	with	 the	power	 sector,	 the	principal	 instrument	addressing	CO2	emissions	 from	
industry	is	the	EU	ETS.	As	discussed	in	Section	4,	the	key	driver	for	reductions	in	CO2	
abatement	 since	 2005	 in	 the	 power	 and	 industry	 sectors	 was	 the	 2008	 financial	
crisis,	which	also	produced	 the	permit	 surplus	which	 the	MSR,	 to	be	 introduced	 in	
2019,	 is	 intended	 to	 address.	 Although	 free	 permit	 allocation	 to	 the	 power	 sector	
ceased	 in	 2013,	 it	 continues	 in	 the	 industry	 sector	 based	 on	 product-specific	
‘benchmarks’;	the	average	CO2	emissions	of	the	top	performing	10%	of	installations	
in	 the	 EU	 producing	 a	 given	 product.	 Installations	 that	 meet	 these	 benchmarks	
receive	100%	free	permit	allocation,	with	others	receiving	less	in	proportion	to	their	
emissions.	Free	allocation	will	reduce	from	80%	in	2013	to	30%	in	2020.	Industries	or	
sub-sectors	 considered	 at	 risk	 of	 carbon	 leakage	 receive	 100%	 free	 allocation,	
continuing	 into	Phase	4	 (2021-2030).	 For	Phase	3	 (2013-2020),	over	150	 industries	
are	considered	at	risk	of	carbon	leakage,	accounting	for	97%	of	industrial	emissions	
(DECC,	 2015).	 A	 revised	 definition	 of	 carbon	 leakage	 will	 be	 applied	 for	 Phase	 4	
(discussed	 below).	 Member	 States	 are	 also	 permitted	 to	 compensate	 electricity-
intensive	 industries	 for	 ‘indirect	 costs’	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 carbon	 price	 on	 electricity	
consumption17.	
	
																																																								
17	Member	States	that	provide	such	compensation	are	the	Netherlands,	Germany,	Greece,	the	UK,	
Spain,	Belgium	(Flanders)	(plus	Norway)	(Carbon	Market	Watch,	2015).	
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The	 second	 key	 instrument	 is	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 Energy	 Efficiency	 Directive	 (EED)	
(2012/27/EU),	which	 requires	 all	 large	 companies18	to	 receive	 a	mandatory	 energy	
audit	 every	 four	 years	 (beginning	 in	 December	 2015	 at	 the	 latest),	 unless	 the	
company	has	implemented	a	certified	Energy	Management	System	(EMS).	Given	the	
recent	 nature	of	 this	 instrument,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	have	had	negligible	 or	 no	 effect	 on	
energy	 consumption	 in	 such	 firms	 thus	 far.	 The	 industry	 sector	 is	 also	 notionally	
subject	to	other	 instruments	 influencing	CO2	emissions	and	energy	consumption	at	
EU	and	Member	State	level,	although	in	practice	exemptions	or	derogations	for	EU	
ETS	sectors	are	in	place	(Branger	&	Quirion,	2013).	A	key	example	is	the	exemption	
for	 energy-intensive	 industries	 from	 the	 common	minimum	 taxation	 requirements	
for	energy	products	laid	down	by	the	Energy	Taxation	Directive	(ETD)	(2003/96/EC).	
	
5.4	Policy	suitability	
	
To	 reach	 2030	 requirements,	 CO2	 emissions	must	 reduce	 by	 an	 annual	 average	 of	
around	1.3%	from	2014	levels.	To	meet	2050	requirements,	the	rate	must	 increase	
to	2.5%	 from	2030.	This	 is	below	the	average	 rate	experienced	between	2004	and	
2014,	 however	 as	 discussed	 above,	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 abatement	may	 be	
ascribed	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Although	 energy	 consumption	 need	 only	 be	
maintained	at	approximately	current	 levels,	rather	than	a	continuation	of	the	1.8%	
average	annual	 reduction	experienced	between	2004	and	2014,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	
conclude	 that	 this	 was	 driven	 to	 a	 substantial	 degree	 by	 the	 financial	 crisis	
(producing	the	reductions	in	CO2	emissions	experienced).		
	
Conclusions	 regarding	 the	 future	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4	 are	 also	
applicable	here.	Although	the	projected	cap	in	both	2030	and	2050	is	more	stringent	
than	 the	 combined	 minimum	 requirements	 of	 the	 power	 and	 industry	 sectors	
presented,	 the	 continued	 surplus	 of	 permits	 (despite	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	MSR	
and	uprated	 LRF)	 renders	achievement	of	 the	2030	cap	 (in	particular)	uncertain	 in	
																																																								
18	Enterprises	which	employ	more	than	250	people,	or	more	than	€50	million	annual	turnover	and	an	
annual	balance	sheet	of	over	€43	million.	
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practice,	and	the	division	between	and	form	of	abatement	taken	by	the	two	sectors	
is	unclear.	
	
In	 principle,	 a	 carbon	price	 of	 €30	 /tCO2	 in	 2030	may	 induce	 relatively	 substantial	
reductions	 to	 energy	 consumption	 and	 CO2	 emissions	 in	 key	 industrial	 sectors.	
Neuhoff	et	al	 (2014a;	2014b)	estimate	potential	 for	a	0.5	MtCO2/year	 reduction	 in	
the	cement	sector,	and	a	15-35%	reduction	in	current	CO2	emissions	from	the	EU’s	
steel	 sector,	 resulting	 from	 the	 use	 of	 the	 most	 energy	 efficient	 technologies	
currently	 available.	 A	 key	 barrier	 for	 the	 installation	 of	 such	measures,	 which	 are	
often	 cost-effective	 at	 current	 energy	 and	 carbon	 prices,	 is	 long	 payback	 periods,	
which	do	not	justify	significant	periods	of	plant	shutdown.	They	state	that	increasing	
CO2	prices	through	a	reformed	EU	ETS	may	be	reduced	or	overcome	this	issue	(but	
only	 above	 a	 €20	 /tCO2	 price	 for	 the	 cement	 sector).	 Additionally,	 Neuhoff	 et	 al	
(2014a)	 suggest	 that	 substitution	 of	 clinker	 in	 cement	 for	 less	 CO2-intensive	
materials	 is	 cost-effective	 at	 carbon	prices	 of	 €10/tCO2,	 but	 have	 not	 been	widely	
adopted	due	to	the	free	allocation	of	permits,	the	pass-through	and	discounting	of	
the	value	of	the	opportunity	cost	of	such	permits.	
	
The	continuation	of	100%	free	permit	allocation	to	sectors	on	the	carbon	leakage	list	
in	 Phase	 4	 may	 therefore	 continue	 to	 dissuade	 such	 investments,	 which	 would	
otherwise	 be	 cost-effective.	 Although	 the	 revised	 criteria	 for	 identifying	 sectors	 at	
risk	 of	 carbon	 leakage	 reduced	 the	 number	 of	 qualifying	 sectors	 by	 around	 two-
thirds,	 the	proportion	of	 industrial	emissions	considered	at	 risk	of	 leakage	 reduces	
only	marginally,	 from	 97%	 to	 94%	 (DECC,	 2015).	 As	 such,	 the	 industry	 sector	 will	
continue	to	be	subject	to	a	carbon	price	under	the	EU	ETS	only	notionally	rather	than	
in	practice,	providing	little	incentive	to	reduce	CO2	emissions	until	at	least	2030.	
	
Estimates	of	carbon	prices	required	to	allow	the	cost	effective	uptake	of	CCS	in	the	
industrial	sector	vary	significantly.	The	IEA	(2012)	estimates	values	of	€55-140/tCO2	
for	CCS	in	iron	and	steel,	and	between	around	€50-185/tCO2	for	the	cement	sector,	
reflecting	 the	 deep	 uncertainty	 that	 remains	 around	 this	 technology	 (not	 least	 its	
availability	in	the	first	instance).	As	such,	even	if	the	industry	sector	were	subject	to	a	
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real	 carbon	 price	 and	 CCS	 were	 available	 and	 within	 the	 price	 ranges	 indicated	
above,	 a	 €30	 /tCO2	 price	 in	 2030	 would	 not	 incentivise	 its	 deployment	 (unless	 a	
clear,	rapidly	rising	and	relatively	predictable	price	were	in	place	soon	thereafter).	
	
It	 is	too	early	to	postulate	how	effective	Article	8	of	the	Energy	Efficiency	Directive	
may	 be	 in	 increasing	 energy	 efficiency	 in	 the	 industrial	 sector.	 However,	 given	 its	
informative	 rather	 than	 incentivising	 nature	 (firms	 are	 not	 required	 to	 act	 on	 the	
information	they	receive	from	audits),	 it	 is	unlikely	to	significantly	alter	the	picture	
painted	above.	 In	addition,	as	energy	demand	is	not	a	criterion,	smaller	companies	
with	 large	 energy	 consumption	 profiles	 are	 not	 covered	 by	 the	 Directive	
(Eichhammer	&	Rohde,	2016).	
	
6. Residential	buildings	sector	
	
6.1	Contemporary	sector	profile	
	
CO2	emissions	from	the	buildings	sector	(residential	and	commercial)	accounted	for	
21%	of	 total	CO2	emissions	 in	 the	EU28	 in	2014.	As	 the	residential	sector	accounts	
for	over	70%	of	this2,	 it	 is	this	sector	on	which	this	paper	will	 focus.	Between	2004	
and	 2014,	 CO2	 emissions	 and	 total	 energy	 consumption	 by	 the	 residential	 sector	
reduced	 by	 an	 annual	 average	 of	 2.7%	 and	 1.8%,	 respectively,	 with	 the	 energy	
carrier	 mix	 remaining	 relatively	 static	 (with	 natural	 gas	 holding	 a	 35-40%	 share,	
electricity	around	25%,	petroleum	products	and	renewables	around	15%	each,	and	
district	heat	and	coal	accounting	for	the	remainder).2,3	The	energy	intensity	of	the	EU	
residential	 stock	 in	 2009	 was	 200	 kWh/m2	 (Lapillonne,	 Pollier	 &	 Sebi,	 n.d),	 and	
reduced	to	around	185	kWh/m2	by	2012	(Gynther,	Lapillonne	&	Pollier,	2015)	–	an	
average	annual	reduction	of	2.6%.19	
	
6.2	Required	sector	profile	–	2030	and	2050	
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The	 four	 studies	 are	 highly	 varied	 in	 their	 projections	 for	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 the	
residential	 buildings	 sector.	 The	 ETM-UCL	 and	 ER2050	 studies	 project	 emissions	
reducing	by	15%	and	40%	by	2030	 from	1990	 levels	 (an	 increase	of	 20%	and	15%	
from	current	levels),	and	reducing	by	15%	and	85%	by	2050	(an	increase	of	15%	and	
a	reduction	of	80%	from	current	levels),	respectively.	The	IEA	projects	a	value	central	
to	this	range	by	2050,	with	a	reduction	of	50%	from	1990	(30%	from	2014)	levels.16	
GINFORS	projects	a	reduction	of	40%	from	1990	(5%	from	2014)	levels	by	2050	for	all	
buildings,	although	given	 its	 relative	dominance,	 this	may	be	taken	as	 indicative	of	
abatement	in	the	residential	sector.	
	
These	 values	driven	 to	a	 significant	extent	by	differences	 in	projected	 final	 energy	
consumption,	which	 range	between	an	 increase	of	 15%	and	 reduction	of	 5%	 from	
1990	(an	increase	of	20%	and	no	change	from	2014)	levels	by	2030,	and	between	no	
change	and	a	reduction	of	30%	on	1990	(an	increase	of	5%	and	a	reduction	of	30%	
on	 2014)	 levels	 by	 2050.	 These	 values	 are	 projected	 by	 ETM-UCL	 and	 ER2050,	
respectively.	The	 IEA	projects	 final	energy	consumption	 to	 increase	by	5%	by	2030	
on	1990	(and	2014),	and	to	reduce	by	5%	by	2050	on	1990	(and	2014)	levels.20	These	
projections	must	be	seen	in	context	of	increasing	energy	service	demands	over	time.	
Using	 residential	 floor	 space	 projections	 employed	 by	 the	 IEA21,	 energy	 intensity	
must	reduce	to	136	–	183	kWh/M2	by	2030,	and	89	–	132	kWh/m2	by	2050.	Again,	
the	 upper	 and	 lower	 values	 are	 projected	 by	 the	 ETM-UCL	 and	 ER2050	 studies,	
respectively	(with	the	IEA	projecting	values	of	145	kWh/m2	in	2030	and	121	kWh/m2	
in	2050).	
	
The	 difference	 in	 final	 energy	 consumption	 (and	 by	 extension	 energy	 intensity)	 in	
these	 projections	 is	 due	 to	 differences	 in	 the	 deployment	 and	 development	 of	
energy	 efficient	 products	 and	 technologies	 for	 both	 building	 envelopes	 (e.g.	
insulation)	 and	 energy-using	 products	 (e.g.	 heating	 systems,	 white	 goods)	 in	 the																																																									
20	1990	and	2014	comparisons	for	GINFORS	are	not	presented,	as	energy	consumption	in	residential	
buildings	cannot	be	readily	disaggregated.	
21	IEA	(2012)	projects	an	increase	in	residential	floor	space	from	19.5	billion	m2	in	2010	to	24.7	billion	
m2	to	2050,	driven	primarily	by	increasing	household	income.	Assumed	to	be	a	linear	increase	
between	2010	and	2050	for	the	calculations	in	this	paper.	
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models.	 The	 ETM-UCL,	 for	 example,	 does	 not	 contain	 building	 envelope	 efficiency	
options.	This	 is	 the	key	driver	behind	 the	 lack	of	more	 substantial	energy	and	CO2	
reductions	over	time	compared	to	other	studies	(Solano-Rodriguez	et	al,	this	issue).	
However,	 as	 cost-optimisation	 models,	 energy-using	 products	 that	 deliver	 cost	
savings	 are	 immediately	deployed,	 achieving	energy	and	CO2	 savings	 at	 a	negative	
cost	 (slimming	 the	 ‘energy	 efficiency	 gap’).	 Changes	 to	 consumer	 preferences	 and	
behaviours	 (e.g.	 reduced	 thermostat	 levels)	 are	 not	 considered	 in	 any	 study	
reviewed.	
	
Although	energy	efficiency	is	projected	to	drive	the	majority	of	CO2	abatement	in	the	
residential	 sector,	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 CO2	 intensity	 of	 the	 energy	 satisfying	 the	
remaining	demand,	particularly	for	space	heating,	is	also	projected.	In	the	IEA	study,	
a	shift	‘mainly	towards	biomass-fuelled	boilers…[and]	high-efficiency,	bi-modal	heat	
pumps	 powered	 by	 low-carbon	 electricity’	 is	 projected	 (IEA,	 2012,	 pg.576).	 The	
ER2050	 study	 also	 projects	 a	 ‘trend	 towards	 electrification	 (i.e.	 heat	 pumps)’	
(European	Commission,	2011b,	pg.16),	whilst	the	GINFORS	results	suggest	that	‘the	
division	of	energy	carriers	 in	[both	residential	and	commercial]	energy	use	remains	
mostly	 constant…[there	 is]	 a	 slight	 increase	 in	 electrification]’	 (Drummond,	 2014).	
However,	 specific	 data	 are	 not	 readily	 available	 for	 these	 studies.	 Data	 from	 the	
ETM-UCL	also	suggest	a	relatively	modest	shift	towards	electrification	(18%	of	final	
energy	demand	 in	 space	heating	 in	2030	and	2050),	with	biomass	and	natural	 gas	
accounting	for	the	majority	of	the	remainder	by	2050.	
	
In	 conclusion,	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 the	 residential	 sector	 should	 be	 at	 least	 30%	
below	 1990	 levels	 by	 2030	 (3%	below	2014	 levels),	 and	 50%	by	 2050	 (31%	below	
2014	levels).	Average	energy	intensity	should	reduce	to	a	maximum	of	150	kWh/m2	
by	2030	and	100	kWh/m2	by	2050,	whilst	residential	space	heating	demand	should	
be	 satisfied	by	at	 least	50%	zero-emission	energy	at	 the	point	of	use,	with	natural	
gas	accounting	for	the	vast	majority	of	the	remainder.	
	
6.3	Policy	landscape	–	key	elements	
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The	Energy	Performance	of	Buildings	Directive	 (EPDB)	 (2010/31/EC)	 contains	 three	
key	 provisions.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 requirement	 for	 minimum	 energy	 performance	
standards	(MEPS)	for	new	buildings,	set	by	each	Member	State.	However,	evidence	
suggests	 that	MEPS	are	often	poorly	enforced,	with	 compliance	often	 found	 to	be	
relatively	 low	 across	 Member	 States	 (Pan	 &	 Garmston,	 2012).	 The	 second	 key	
provision	 is	 the	 requirement	 for	 all	 new	 buildings	 from	 2020	 to	 be	 classified	 as	
‘nearly-zero	 energy	 buildings’	 (NZEB),	 with	 remaining	 energy	 consumption	 to	 be	
substantially	satisfied	by	renewables.	The	third	provision	 is	 the	requirement	 for	an	
Energy	 Performance	 Certificate	 (EPC),	 illustrating	 energy	 performance	 data,	 to	 be	
issued	for	any	building	sold	or	rented	to	a	new	owner	or	tenant.	Whilst	all	Member	
States	have	a	 functioning	EPC	 scheme,	 their	design	and	 structure	differ	 somewhat	
(often	 resulting	 from	 a	 slow	 and	 partial	 implementation	 of	 the	 EPBD),	 producing	
different	levels	of	clarity	and	effectiveness	(Economidou	et	al,	2011).	
	
Article	 7	 of	 the	 EED	 requires	 Member	 States	 to	 introduce	 Energy	 Efficiency	
Obligation	Schemes	(EEOS),	 for	energy	distributors	and	suppliers	to	achieve	annual	
savings	of	1.5%	total	average	energy	sales	by	volume	over	2009-2012,	each	year	over	
the	 period	 2014-2020.	 Eligible	 savings	 may	 be	 produced	 in	 any	 end-use	 sector,	
although	transport	and	EU	ETS	sector	may	be	excluded	from	the	initial	sales	volume	
calculation.	Member	States	may	use	alternative	 instruments	 to	achieve	 the	 target.	
Of	the	479	instruments	Member	States	have	reported	will	contribute	to	compliance,	
21	 (4%)	are	EEOS	 (targeting	34%	of	 required	savings).	The	 largest	category	 is	 fiscal	
incentives	 (including	 grants),	 at	 184	 (38%,	 targeting	 19%	of	 savings)	 (Forster	et	 al,	
2016).	Member	States	project	42%	of	savings	will	be	achieved	in	the	(residential	and	
commercial)	buildings	sector	(Rosenow	et	al,	2016).	
	
The	Ecodesign	Directive	(2009/125/EC)	subjects	an	expanding	range	of	energy-using	
and	 energy-related	 products	 to	 minimum	 environmental	 performance	 standards	
(usually	related	to	in-use	energy	consumption).	The	Energy	Labelling	Directive	(ELD)	
(2010/30/EU)	requires	energy-using	and	energy-related	products,	usually	those	also	
obligated	 under	 the	 Ecodesign	 Directive,	 to	 display	 energy	 efficiency	 labels	 at	 the	
point	 of	 sale.	 Products	 covered	 include	 heating,	 ventilation	 and	 air	 conditioning	
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systems,	 various	 consumer	 appliances	 and	 lighting	 products	 across	 a	 range	 of	
sectors.	 Kemna	 (2014)	 find	 that	 the	 combination	of	 these	 instruments	 is	 relatively	
effective	 in	 delivering	 energy	 savings,	 projecting	 savings	 in	 2020	 of	 19	 against	 the	
counterfactual%	 for	 the	 products	 covered,	 however	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	 ELD	 is	 a	
substantial	 contributor	 to	 this,	 for	 three	 reasons.	 First,	 the	 introduction	of	A	 ‘plus’	
labels	produces	confusion	and	a	feeling	of	diminishing	returns,	reducing	its	efficacy	
compared	to	the	simpler	‘A-G’	scale	used	pre-2010	(LE	and	Ipsos,	2014;	Heinzle	and	
Wüstenhagen,	 2012).	 Secondly,	 around	90%	of	 appliances	 covered	 fall	 into	 the	 ‘A’	
category	 (Heinzle	 &	 Wüstenhagen,	 2012),	 reducing	 the	 ability	 for	 consumers	 to	
differentiate	 between	 products.	 Thirdly,	 even	 if	 consumers	 are	 aware	 of	 and	
presented	 with	 the	 label,	 the	 information	 communicated	 is	 only	 effective	 in	
impacting	product	choice	if	the	consumer	considers	it	important.	Waide	and	Watson	
(2013)	found	that	almost	half	of	their	multi-country	respondents	considered	energy	
efficiency	a	 key	aspect	 in	purchase	decisions	 for	products	with	energy	 labels,	with	
aspects	such	as	capital	cost	likely	to	hold	higher	importance.	
	
As	with	 the	 industrial	 sector,	household	energy	consumption	may	be	exempt	 from	
the	minimum	taxation	requirements	of	the	ETD.	It	may	also	be	subject	to	a	reduced-
rate	VAT,	under	the	VAT	Directive	(2006/112/EC).	In	the	UK	alone,	the	application	of	
a	 5%	 VAT	 rather	 than	 the	 standard	 20%	 rate	 produces	 an	 implicit	 annual	 energy	
subsidy	 of	 £5	 billion	 (Advani	 et	 al,	 2013)	 (although	 the	 EU	 ETS	 places	 a	 upstream	
carbon	 price	 on	 electricity	 consumption,	 and	 many	 Member	 States	 fund	 their	
renewable	 electricity	 support	mechanisms	 through	 a	 levy	 on	 household	 electricity	
bills).	
	
6.4	Policy	suitability	
	
To	 reach	 the	minimum	 requirements	by	2030,	 CO2	 emissions	 should	 reduce	by	 an	
annual	average	of	around	0.2%	from	2014	levels.	Energy	intensity	must	reduce	at	an	
annual	average	of	1.3%.	To	meet	2050	requirements,	these	rates	must	increase	to	an	
annual	average	of	1.7%	and	2%	from	2030,	respectively.	These	rates	are	below	the	
average	experienced	 in	 recent	years,	which	were	driven	by	a	combination	of	more	
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efficient	 new	 buildings,	 renovation	 of	 existing	 buildings,	 and	more	 efficient	 space	
heating	and	electric	appliances	 (Gynther	et	al,	2015),	 likely	 induced	to	a	significant	
degree	by	the	instruments	described	above	(and	their	predecessors).	However,	the	
extent	to	which	such	instruments	may	allow	for	such	rates	to	continue	is	uncertain.	
	
The	EPBD	allows	Member	States	to	set	the	definition	of	‘nearly-zero’	for	NZEBs,	with	
many	 setting	 such	 definitions	 well	 above	 zero,	 most	 commonly	 at	 45-50	
kWh/m2/year	 for	 residential	properties	 (BPIE,	2015).	Two	 issues	may	prevent	even	
these	levels	from	being	achieved	in	practice.	The	first	is	the	potential	for	a	continued	
lack	of	enforcement	of	MEPS.	The	 second	 is	 the	 ‘performance	gap’	phenomenon	 -	
the	 difference	 between	 expected	 and	 actual	 energy	 (or	 CO2)	 savings	 from	 the	
introduction	of	a	given	technology	or	measure.	The	evaluation	of	the	performance	of	
a	technology	or	measure	is	usually	based	on	engineering	and	modelled	estimates	of	
how	 it	 will	 perform,	 rather	 than	 actual	 measured	 energy	 or	 CO2	 savings	 –	 an	
approach	 that	 routinely	 overestimates	 actual	 outcomes	 (Rosenow	&	Galvin,	 2013)	
Additionally,	 few	Member	 States	 require	 any	 proportion	 of	 the	 remaining	 energy	
consumption	to	be	satisfied	by	renewables	(Ecofys,	2014).	
	
Although	 at	 least	 two-thirds	 of	 existing	 buildings	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 present	 in	 2050	
(Šajn,	 2016),	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 potential	 issues	 with	 the	 key	 instruments	
designed	 to	 increase	 their	 energy	 efficiency.	 Although	 the	 Ecodesign	 Directive	 (in	
particular)	 has	 been	 (and	 is	 projected)	 to	 significantly	 increase	 the	 efficiency	 of	
energy-using	products,	 this	does	not	 influence	the	efficiency	of	building	envelopes,	
which	 as	 discussed	 above,	 is	 key	 in	 reducing	 energy	 consumption	 (and	 associated	
CO2	 emissions)	 in	 the	 sector.	 Article	 7	 of	 the	 EED	 is	 notionally	 designed	 to	 induce	
such	efficiency	measures.	However,	under	half	of	the	annual	1.5%	annual	reduction	
target	 is	 ascribed	 to	 efficiency	 in	 buildings,	 and	 still	 less	 the	 residential	 sector.	 In	
addition,	Rosenow	et	al	(2016)	estimate	that	around	86%	of	expected	energy	savings	
as	notified	by	Member	States	are	at	least	partially	at	risk	of	not	being	realised	due	to	
ineligibility	 of	 notified	 measures,	 a	 lack	 of	 additionality	 of	 savings,	 risk	 of	 non-
delivery,	and	risk	of	double	counting.	Issues	surrounding	the	performance	gap	are	in	
addition	to	this.	Even	if	such	items	were	to	be	corrected,	the	obligation	by	Member	
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States	to	increase	energy	efficiency	of	the	end-use	sectors	ceases	in	2020	under	this	
Directive	and	within	the	broader	climate	and	energy	framework	targets.22	
	
The	 lack	of	 requirements	by	Member	States	 for	new	buildings	 from	2020	 to	 cover	
remaining	 energy	 consumption	 from	 renewables	 (despite	 EPBD	 requirements),	
coupled	 with	 taxation	 exemptions,	 effective	 subsidisation	 of	 domestic	 energy	
consumption	 in	 some	 Member	 States	 and	 the	 application	 of	 carbon	 pricing	 to	
electricity	only,	means	there	is	little	requirement	or	incentive	to	shift	towards	zero-
emission	energy	at	the	point	of	use	in	this	sector.		
	
7. Road	transport	sector	
	
7.1	Contemporary	sector	profile	
	
CO2	emissions	from	the	(domestic)	transport	sector	accounted	for	25%	of	total	CO2	
emissions	in	the	EU28	in	2014.	The	road	transport	sector	accounts	for	around	95%	of	
this.2	Between	2004	and	2014,	CO2	emissions	and	total	energy	consumption	by	the	
road	transport	sector	reduced	by	an	annual	average	of	0.8%	and	0.4%,	respectively.	
The	 energy	 carrier	mix	 in	 road	 transport	 remained	 relatively	 static	 over	 this	 time,	
with	 petroleum	 products	 accounting	 for	 around	 95%	 of	 total	 energy	 consumption	
(with	a	shift	towards	diesel	from	petrol,	with	the	latter	reducing	from	41%	to	29%	of	
total	 petroleum	 products	 consumed).	 The	 remaining	 5%	 comprised	 largely	 of	
electricity	and	renewables	(i.e.	biofuels).2,3	
	
As	 passenger	 cars	 account	 for	 over	 60%	 of	 both	 CO2	 emissions2	 and	 energy	
consumption	in	road	transport,23,	and	83%	of	all	inland	passenger	transport3,	and	as	
it	 is	the	sub-sector	which,	as	discussed	below,	is	projected	to	require	and	drive	the	
largest	abatement	efforts	in	road	transport	in	the	future,	it	is	on	this	mode	that	this	
paper	will	focus.	CO2	emissions	from	cars	reduced	at	an	average	annual	rate	of	0.7%																																																									
22	In	 contrast	with	 the	 2020	 targets,	 as	with	 renewables,	 the	 2030	 Climate	 and	 Energy	 Framework	
target	for	energy	efficiency	is	to	be	binding	at	the	EU	level	only.	
23	As	reported	by	the	ETM-UCL.	
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between	 2004	 and	 2014	 (although	 emissions	 increased	 between	 2004	 and	 2007,	
following	a	long-term	trend,	this	has	been	offset	by	relatively	rapid	reductions	since	
2008).2	 The	 average	 CO2	 intensity	 of	 new	 cars	 purchased	 has	 reduced	 from	 163.4	
gCO2/km	 in	 2004,	 to	 123.4	 gCO2/km	 in	 2014	 (EEA,	 2015b)	 -	 an	 average	 annual	
reduction	of	4	gCO2/km.	
	
7.2	Required	sector	profile	–	2030	and	2050	
	
The	 studies	 project	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 road	 transport	 to	 develop	 between	 a	 7%	
increase	and	a	21%	reduction	 from	1990	 levels	by	2030	 (ETM-UCL	and	GINFORS24,	
respectively),	and	to	reduce	between	15%	and	65%	by	2050	(ETM-UCL	and	ER2050,	
respectively).	These	translate	to	reductions	of	between	10%	and	35%	by	2030,	and	
30%	 and	 70%	 by	 2050,	 below	 current	 levels.	 GINFORS	 and	 ER2050	 project	 final	
energy	 consumption	 to	 reduce	 by	 around	 15%	 from	 current	 levels	 by	 2030,	 but	
diverge	 to	 a	 reduction	 of	 between	 10%	 and	 45%	 on	 current	 levels	 by	 2050,	
respectively.	The	ETM-UCL	projects	energy	consumption	in	road	transport	to	remain	
largely	 stable	 over	 the	 assessment	 horizon,	 whilst	 the	 IEA	 projects	 2050	
consumption	to	reduce	by	35%	from	current	levels.16	
	
These	 values	 are	 in	 large	 part	 a	 result	 of	 changes	 (or	 not)	 to	 the	 profile	 of	 final	
energy	consumption	 in	passenger	cars.	The	ETM-UCL	projects	energy	consumption	
to	 remain	 stable	 over	 time,	 with	 relatively	minor	 shifts	 in	 fuel	 profile	 (petrol	 and	
diesel	continue	to	satisfy	over	75%	of	energy	demand,	although	with	a	shift	 to	the	
latter,	which	exhibits	a	lower	CO2	intensity),	producing	relatively	modest	abatement	
in	 road	 transport	 by	 2050.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 ER2050	 study	 projects	 energy	
consumption	reducing	by	60%	from	current	levels	by	2050,	coupled	with	substantial	
electrification;	almost	80%	of	private	passenger	transport	demand	satisfied	either	by	
plug-in	 hybrid	 or	 pure	 electric	 vehicles	 (European	 Commission,	 2012,	 p.20),	
producing	much	more	 extensive	 CO2	 abatement	 than	 other	 studies.	 As	 such,	 CO2																																																									
24	However,	 in	 GINFORS,	 the	 ‘transport’	 sector	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 service	 sector	 delivering	 transport	
services	 to	 commercial	 activities	 and	 private	 households.	 Private	 individual	 car	 use	 is	 considered	
separately,	under	‘household’	emissions.	
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emissions	from	passenger	cars	should	reduce	by	at	least	20%	from	current	levels	by	
2030,	and	50%	by	2050.	
	
These	 developments	must	 take	 place	 despite	 a	 likely	 increase	 in	 passenger	 travel	
demand.	The	ER2050	study	projects	passenger-kilometre	demand	for	private	cars	to	
increase	 by	 28%,	 whilst	 the	 ETM-UCL	 projects	 a	 72%	 increase	 in	 passenger	 car	
vehicle-kilometre	demand.	Neither	ETM-UCL	or	GINFORS	consider	modal	shift,	such	
as	from	private	cars	to	public	transport,	as	a	function	of	scenario	and	model	design.	
Both	 IEA	 and	 ER2050	 assume	 some	 small	 modal	 shift	 (largely	 from	 aviation	 and	
private	cars	to	public	transport	and	rail),	although	the	effect	is	relatively	minor.	The	
CO2	 intensity	 of	 all	 passenger	 cars	 should	 therefore	 decrease	 from	 approximately	
290	gCO2/km	at	present,	to	a	maximum	of	180	gCO2/km	by	2030,	and	90	gCO2/km	by	
2050.25		
	
7.3	Policy	landscape	–	key	elements	
	
Regulation	 443/2009	 sets	 fleet-average	 CO2	 emission	 performance	 standards	 for	
new	cars	registered	in	the	EU,	for	each	manufacturer,	set	at	130	gCO2/km	from	2015,	
and	 95gCO2/km	 by	 2021.	 In	 2015	 the	 average	 value	 for	 new	 cars	 registered	 was	
119.6gCO2/km	 (8%	below	 the	 target)	 (EEA,	 2016a).	 However,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	
(and	increasing)	gap	between	the	results	of	laboratory	tests	upon	which	compliance	
is	based,	and	real-world	performance	of	vehicles.	ICCT	(2015)	estimate	on-the-road	
CO2	 emissions	 to	 be	 36%	higher	 than	 lab-based	 tests	 for	 private	 cars	 and	45%	 for	
company	cars,	meaning	that	the	CO2	intensity	of	new	vehicles	is	likely	not	decreasing	
at	the	rate	at	the	rate	officially	reported.	To	reduce	this	differential,	it	was	agreed	in	
March	2014	 that	 the	Worldwide	harmonised	 Light	 vehicles	 Test	 Procedure	 (WLTP)	
will	 be	 adopted	 in	 the	 coming	 years.	 Despite	 this,	 the	 regulation	 is	 likely	 to	 have	
induced	some	reduction	 in	CO2	 intensity	of	 the	average	new	passenger	car	against	
the	counterfactual.	However,	 the	EEA	 (2012)	suggest	 that	 the	 financial	crisis	was	a																																																									
25	Current	value	calculated	using	2014	CO2	emissions	from	passenger	cars,	and	assuming	static	
transport	demand	of	1,816	bvkm	as	reported	by	the	ETM-UCL	for	2010.	2030	value	assumes	25%	
increase	in	vehicle-kilometres,	and	50%	by	2050.	
Paul	Drummond	&	Paul	Ekins	(2016)		
Climate	Policy	
key	 contributor	 to	 the	 shift	 towards	 the	 purchase	 of	 smaller,	 less	 powerful	 (and	
therefore	less	CO2-intensive)	cars	since	2007,	reducing	overall	CO2	emissions	overall,	
ceteris	paribus,	against	the	counterfactual.	In	addition,	the	EEA	(2015c)	indicates	the	
financial	 crisis	 is	 also	 likely	 to	 have	 been	 a	 primary	 driver	 for	 the	 levelling	 and	
subsequent	 reduction	 in	 passenger	 car	 transport	 demand	 since	 2009	 (as	 part	 of	 a	
wider	 reduction	 in	 passenger	 transport	 demand),	 further	 reducing	 total	 CO2	
emissions	from	the	sector.		
	
Three	 other	 instruments	 are	 applied	 at	 the	 EU	 level.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 ETD,	 which	
applies	EU-wide	minimum	tax	rates	on	transport	fuel.	These	rates	are	levied	on	the	
basis	of	fuel	volume,	producing	different	minimum	rates	on	an	energy	(€10	/GJ	and	
€8	/GJ	for	petrol	and	diesel,	respectively)	and	carbon	content	basis	(€145	/tCO2	and	
€100	 /tCO2)	 (European	 Commission,	 2011a).	 However,	most	Member	 States	 apply	
rates	 (often	 significantly)	 above	 the	minima,	with	 only	 two	 applying	 the	minimum	
rate	for	petrol,	and	seven	for	diesel	 (Maca	et	al,	2013).	 In	 January	2015,	taxes	and	
levies	comprised	an	average	of	65%	of	petrol	prices	across	the	EU,	and	35%	of	diesel	
prices	(a	tax	component	of	€0.76/l	and	€0.36/l,	respectively)	(Drummond,	2015).	
	
The	second	instrument	is	the	RED,	which	requires	10%	of	final	energy	consumption	
in	 transport	 to	be	sourced	 from	renewables	by	2020.	 In	2014,	 this	 rate	was	5.9%3,	
which	 the	 EEA	 (2016b)	 estimate	 reduced	 emissions	 from	 the	 sector	 by	 39	MtCO2	
(equivalent	to	a	reduction	of	around	4.5%	of	road	transport	emissions	in	that	year).	
However,	the	European	Commission	(2015)	find	that	slow	progress	toward	the	2020	
target	 is	 being	 made,	 largely	 a	 result	 of	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 and	 increasing	
awareness	of	indirect	land-use	change	effects	of	first	generation	biofuel,	along	with	
lack	of	commercially	available	advanced	 (second	and	third	generation)	biofuels.	To	
tackle	 these	 issues,	 amendments	 in	 2015	 to	 the	 RED	 and	 Fuel	 Quality	 Directive	
(2009/30/EC),	 inter	 alia,	 limit	 the	 share	 of	 biofuels	 derived	 from	 crops	 grown	 on	
agricultural	 land	 limited	 to	 7%	 of	 the	 10%	 target,	 establish	 an	 indicative	 target	 of	
0.5%	 for	 advanced	 biofuels,	 and	 introduce	 stronger	 incentives	 for	 the	 use	 of	
renewable	electricity	by	increasing	its	weighting	in	calculations	for	compliance	with	
the	2020	target.	
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The	third	instrument	is	Directive	1999/94/EC,	on	the	CO2	labelling	of	passenger	cars,	
which	 requires	 Member	 States	 to	 ensure	 information	 regarding	 CO2	 intensity	 is	
provided	 to	 the	 consumer	 at	 the	 point	 of	 sale	 of	 a	 new	 passenger	 car.	 Various	
studies	 conclude	 that	 these	 labels	 have	 had	 no	 noticeable	 effect	 on	 consumer	
purchasing	decisions,	due	 to	a	 combination	of	a	 lack	of	awareness	of	 these	 labels,	
poor	 understanding	 of	 what	 the	 labels	 mean	 when	 consumers	 are	 aware,	 and	 a	
more	fundamental	 issue	of	the	 low	importance	consumers	place	on	environmental	
concerns	relative	to	other	factors	(such	as	price,	safety	and	performance)	(Gartner,	
2005;	AEA,	2011;	Codagnone	et	al,	2013).	
	
Although	 excluded	 from	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper,	 other	 instruments	 initiated	
independently	 at	Member	 State	 level	 hold	 influence	 over	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 the	
passenger	 car	 fleet.	 Key	 examples	 include	 registration	 and	 circulation	 (ownership)	
taxes	 (in	which	 14	Member	 States	 consider	 CO2	 emissions	 as	 a	 parameter	 for	 the	
former,	and	12	for	the	latter	(van	Essen	et	al,	2012)),	and	subsides	for	the	purchase	
of	 low-emission	 vehicles.	 In	 addition,	 company	 car	 tax	 arrangements	 in	 most	
Member	 States	 constitute	 a	 substantial	market	 distortion.	 In	 all	Member	 States,	 a	
company	car	is	bought	by	the	employer	for	use	by	the	employee,	who	declares	the	
vehicle	as	an	in-kind	benefit	as	part	of	taxable	income	(with	the	particular	proportion	
determined	 differently	 between	 Member	 States).	 Fuel	 costs	 are	 also	 commonly	
covered	 by	 the	 employer,	 which	 is	 often,	 alongside	 the	 costs	 of	 maintenance,	
insurance	 and	 other	 taxes,	 plus	 the	 purchase	 price	 of	 the	 vehicle	 itself,	 VAT	
deductible.	Additionally,	as	the	employee	receives	the	vehicle	as	an	 in-kind	benefit	
substituting	for	a	proportion	of	forgone	salary,	social	security	and	other	related	taxes	
levied	on	income,	which	are	paid	by	both	the	employer	and	employee,	are	not	due.	
This	incentivises	the	purchase	of	larger,	often	more	CO2-intensive	vehicles,	with	the	
driver	of	 the	vehicle	not	 liable	 for	 fuel	costs,	and	thus	 incentives	to	adjust	mileage	
(Maca	et	al	2013).	
	
7.4	Policy	suitability	
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To	 reach	 the	 minimum	 requirements	 by	 2030,	 CO2	 emissions	 must	 reduce	 by	 an	
annual	average	of	around	1.4%	from	2014	levels.	To	meet	2050	requirements,	these	
rates	 must	 increase	 to	 an	 annual	 average	 of	 2.3%	 from	 2030.	 This	 exceeds	 the	
average	rate	of	0.8%	experienced	between	2004	and	2014.2		
	
For	 the	 CO2	 intensity	 of	 the	 passenger	 car	 fleet	 to	 reduce	 to	 a	 maximum	 of	 180	
gCO2/km	 by	 2030,	 and	 90	 gCO2/km	 by	 2050,	 assuming	 a	 full	 replacement	 of	 the	
passenger	 car	 fleet	 in	 Europe	 every	 13	 years,	 (McKinsey&Co,	 2009,	 p.21),	 the	
average	CO2	 intensity	of	new	cars	purchased	must	 reach	 these	 levels	by	2017	and	
2037,	 respectively.	Although	 the	 reported	average	CO2	 intensity	of	new	vehicles	 is	
already	well	below	the	2030	target,	as	discussed,	this	value	is	not	being	achieved	in	
practice.	Assuming	on-the-road	emissions	are	on	average	40%	above	that	reported	
for	new	vehicles	(both	private	and	company	cars),	cars	sold	 in	2015	exhibit	a	fleet-
average	of	around	200	gCO2/km.	This	value	should	therefore	reduce	by	at	 least	10	
gCO2/km	in	both	2016	and	2017	for	the	2030	target	to	be	achieved	–	over	twice	the	
average	 rate	 of	 reduction	 for	 reported	 values.	 This	 value	 may	 then	 reduce	 to	 an	
average	 annual	 reduction	 of	 4.5	 gCO2/km	 to	 2037,	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 2050	
target.	However,	 if	 the	 target	of	95	gCO2/km	 in	2021	 is	 achieved	both	 in	 reported	
and	on-the-road	emissions	 through	 the	use	of	 the	WLTP,	 then	 it	 is	 likely	 that	both	
the	 2030	 and	 2050	 targets	 for	 CO2	 intensity	 would	 be	 comfortably	 achieved.	
Although,	at	 the	 time	of	writing,	neither	 the	date	 for	 introduction	of	 the	new	 test	
procedure,	or	its	specific	design	(and	thus	the	extent	to	which	the	report	and	on-the-
road	differential	will	be	 reduced),	had	been	agreed.	 Instruments	 introduced	at	 the	
Member	 State	 level	 (registration	 and	 circulation	 taxes,	 and	 subsidies)	 are	 likely	 to	
continue	 to	 influence	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 average	 CO2	 intensity	 of	 new	 cars	
purchased,	 regardless	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 and	 rate	 at	 which	 the	 above	 Regulation	
increases	 stringency	 in	 practice.	 In	 combination,	 such	 measures	 are	 likely	 to	
determine	 achievement,	 or	 otherwise,	 or	 the	 transport-related	 RED	 target	 (along	
with	the	increased	weighting	afforded	to	electricity).	
	
Whilst	these	instruments	act	to	influence	the	composition	of	the	passenger	car	fleet,	
they	do	not	influence	the	extent	to	which	such	vehicles	are	driven.	Fuel	prices	are	a	
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key	 determinant	 of	 travel	 demand	 (Nijland	et	 al,	 2012).	 Although	 taxes	 and	 levies	
(notionally	 governed	 by	 the	 ETD,	 but	which	 is	 only	 binding	 in	 practice	 for	 a	 small	
number	of	Member	States)	were	a	substantial	proportion	of	petrol	and	diesel	prices	
in	the	EU	in	January	2015,	underlying	(and	relatively	unpredictable)	fuel	costs	(driven	
by	 international	 oil	 markets)	 are	 more	 significant	 over	 time	 in	 determining	 final	
prices.	For	example,	between	2005	and	2015,	average	EU	petrol	prices	fluctuated	by	
approximately	 the	 same	 value	 as	 the	 taxes	 and	 levies	 proportion	 of	 the	 price	 in	
January	 2015.	 For	 diesel,	 it	 was	 almost	 double. 26 	However,	 company	 car	 tax	
arrangements	 in	 many	 Member	 States	 act	 to	 dampen	 or	 even	 remove	 the	 price	
signal	 provided	 by	 fuel	 prices,	 regardless	 of	 level	 and	 composition.	 Given	 the	
proportion	of	company	cars	in	the	EU	fleet	(around	half	of	all	new	car	purchases	in	
the	 EU	 are	 company	 cars	 (Copenhagen	 Economics,	 2010),	 such	 an	 effect	 is	
significant.	
	
8. Conclusions	
	
This	paper	provides	an	overview	of	whether	the	policy	landscape	at	the	EU	level	for	
key	 sectors	 of	 the	 energy	 system	 (power	 generation,	 heavy	 industry,	 residential	
buildings	 and	 road	 (passenger	 car)	 transport)	 is	 suitable	 for	 driving	 the	 changes	
required	for	a	cost-effective	decarbonisation	pathway	in	the	EU.	
	
For	the	power	and	industry	sectors	(and	the	wider	economy),	the	EU	ETS	has	been	
the	 cornerstone	 instrument	 for	 CO2	 abatement	 since	 2005.	 However,	 it	 has	 been	
largely	ineffective	in	driving	CO2	abatement	in	these	sectors,	with	abatement	largely	
driven	 by	 the	 2007/8	 financial	 crisis.	 Although	 future	 amendments	 to	 the	 EU	 ETS	
(designed	to	correct	current	failures)	are	likely	to	underachieve	against	their	stated	
objectives,	 the	 abatement	 achieved	 by	 2030	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 in	 line	 with	 collective	
requirements	 for	 these	sectors.	 If	 the	cap	continues	to	reduce	beyond	2030	at	 the	
post-2021	 rate,	 2050	 abatement	 targets	will	 also	 likely	 be	 achieved.	 In	 the	 power	
sector,	 renewable	 electricity	 support	 mechanisms	 have	 been	 successful	 in	
																																																								
26	Data	sourced	from	the	European	Commission’s	Weekly	Oil	Bulletin.	
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stimulating	 deployment,	 however	 non-economic	 factors	 (such	 as	 planning	 and	
authorisation	 procedures)	 and	 the	 lack	 of	Member	 State-level	 renewables	 targets	
post-2030	may	 substantially	 retard	 the	 rate	 of	 deployment	 in	 the	 future.	 A	more	
substantial	 issue	 is	 the	 design	 of	 the	 electricity	 market,	 which	 is	 currently	 not	
designed	 to	 cater	 for	 a	 high	 penetration	 of	 renewables	 alongside	 conventional	
generation.	 In	the	Industry	sector,	the	continuation	of	free	permit	allocation	under	
the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 installations	 is	 likely	 to	 provide	 little	 incentive	
abatement	in	the	short-	to	medium-term.	
	
The	 ability	 of	 the	 policy	 landscape	 in	 the	 residential	 building	 sector	 to	 drive	 the	
changes	required	to	2030,	and	particularly	2050,	 is	questionable.	Requirements	for	
‘nearly-zero	energy	buildings’	by	2020	are	likely	to	be	significantly	underachieved	in	
practice	due	to	the	low	ambition	of	specific	regulations	imposed	by	Member	States,	
and	 the	 lack	 of	 enforcement	 of	 existing	 requirements.	 Almost	 all	 energy	 savings	
targeted	by	 instruments	designed	to	encourage	energy	efficiency	 improvements	 to	
the	 fabric	 of	 existing	 buildings,	 where	 the	 majority	 of	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 CO2	
abatement	opportunities	lay,	are	at	least	partially	at	risk	of	not	being	realised.	Even	
if	 this	were	not	 the	case,	 the	 targeted	savings	are	 insufficient,	and	Member	States	
are	not	obligated	to	extend	them	after	2020.	In	addition,	the	uptake	of	low-carbon	
energy	in	this	sector	is	not	commonly	required	or	incentivised,	and	due	to	misaligned	
fiscal	signals,	actively	discriminated	against.	
	
Regulation	443/2009,	which	seeks	to	progressively	reduce	the	CO2	intensity	of	new	
cars	 in	 the	 EU,	 is	 the	 principal	 instrument	 for	 reducing	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 the	
passenger	 car	 sector	 (the	 sector	 commonly	 projected	 to	 drive	 abatement	 in	 the	
wider	(road)	transport	sector).	However,	differences	between	reported	and	on-the-
road	emissions	are	 substantial,	 significantly	 reducing	 the	purported	 success	of	 this	
instrument.	 A	 new	 compliance	 procedure	 is	 to	 be	 introduced	 to	 reduce	 this	
differential,	and	coupled	with	the	existing	targets,	may	allow	this	 instrument	alone	
to	satisfy	2030	and	perhaps	2050	requirements.	However,	the	procedure	design	has	
not	 been	 finalised,	 or	 date	 of	 introduction	 agreed,	 injecting	 uncertainty	 into	 this	
conclusion.	 Regardless,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Member	 State-level	 instruments,	 such	 as	
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registration,	circulation	and	fuel	taxes,	and	arrangements	for	company	car	taxation,	
will	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 car	 fleet	 and	 associated	 CO2	
emissions.	
	
In	summary,	the	suite	of	EU	policies	designed	to	encourage	the	decarbonisation	of	
key	 sectors	 of	 the	 energy	 system	 exhibits	 a	 range	 of	 issues,	 including	 a	 lack	 of	
appropriate	 stringency	 in	 design	 or	 practice,	 a	 lack	 of	 practical	 implementation	 or	
enforcement	 of	 stated	 requirements,	 and	 short-termism,	 with	 a	 number	 of	
instruments,	 targets	or	 requirements	expiring	or	 subject	 to	 substantial	 uncertainty	
after	the	early	2020s.	Such	issues	must	be	corrected	if	the	EU	is	to	maintain	a	cost-
effective	decarbonisation	pathway	over	the	coming	decades.	
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